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REAF'FlRMING RELATIONSIIlP-SPECIFIC
INVESTMENTS
Comments on Miwa and Ramseyer's
'Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments'
Scott E. Masten*

I, too, have a work-related anecdote from my youth to relate. During
one summer break from college, I had a job on the night shift in the can
ning plant of a Coca-Cola bottling franchisee in my hometown in New
Hampshire. The process of canning tonic (known as "soda" outside of
New England) consisted of three stages, beginning with the fabrication of
cans in a room at one end of the building and concluding with the filling
and sealing operations in a room at the other end. In between, workers in
a third room inspected cans as they arrived by conveyor from the fabrica
tion facility, loaded empty cans onto pallets for storage, and unloaded cans
of the appropriate type (Coke, Tab, and Shasta) back onto the conveyor to
assure a continuous supply of containers to the filling room "down
stream."
The year was 1976 and Oliver Williamson's Markets and Hierarchies,
published just the year before, had not yet found its way into the under
graduate cu"iculum. Nevertheless, I recall finding it curious at the time to
learn that the can fabrication operation in the adjoining room was a sepa
rate company from the bottling franchise that stored, filled, and, ulti
mately, distributed the cans.
If youthful experience colors one's perceptions, it would seem that
I, rather than Professors Miwa and Ramseyer, should be the one ex
pressing skepticism about the importance of relationship-specific in
vestments in organization decisions. Whereas the separate ownership
of can fabrication and filling operations, despite the location specific
ity of the facilities, at least appears to conflict with the relationship
specific investment hypothesis, the circuit factory in which one of them
once worked exhibited neither specific investments nor special gov
ernance arrangements - exactly as the theory predicts! What's more,
as I will argue below, the same can be said of virtually all of their evi
dence.
To be fair, Miwa and Ramseyer neither intend nor claim to refute
the relationship-specific investment hypothesis. On the contrary, they
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say the theory makes sense.1 And the evidence - their "empirical
vacuum" derogation notwithstanding - does, by their own account,
provide "substantial evidence of the relation between RSis and
governance."2 The problem, as Miwa and Ramseyer see it, is that set
tings in which investments are large and specific enough to affect the
choice of governance arrangements are so few and anomalous as to
render the theory irrelevant for understanding the organization of
everyday industries. Modern manufacturing simply entails far fewer
relationship-specific investments than transaction-cost economists
would have us believe. And where such investments do arise, reputa
tion and standard market contracting adequately deal with the associ
ated problems. As a logician might put it, the theory, though valid,
lacks existential import.
Miwa and Ramseyer are not the first, nor even the most promi
nent, scholars to express reservations about the theory's domain. In
deed, no less an authority on the transaction-cost determinants of or
ganizational form than Ronald Coase has questioned the importance
of specific investments on repeated occasions - most recently, in his
extensive critique of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian's analysis of Gen
eral Motors' 1926 acquisition of Fisher Body.3 From his observations
of the U.S. automotive industry in the 1930s, Coase saw that "suppli
ers were often unwilling to sell too great a proportion of their output
to one customer"4 for fear that that customer might take advantage of
its position "to drive down the price to a level which yields no return
on such investments."5 Further inquiry, however, led him "to doubt
not the reality of this risk, but its importance"6: "Even though the
costs of contracting [may] increase more than the costs of vertical in
tegration as assets become more specific and quasi rents increase, ver
tical integration will not displace the long-term contract unless the
co,sts of contracting become greater than the costs of vertical integra
tion
"7 And that, Coase adds incisively, "might never happen for
.

.

.

.

1. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments:
Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2636, 2637 {2000).
2 Id.
3. See R.H.Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & ECON.
15 (2000) [hereinafter Coase, Fisher Body] (criticizing Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Inte
gration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297
{1978)).
4. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm:

Origin, Meaning, Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. &

ORG. 3, 44 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, Nature of the Firm].
5. Id.at42.
6. Id.at44.
7. Id. at43.
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any value of quasi rents actually found."8 The reason is that "the pro
pensity for opportunistic behavior is usually effectively checked by the
need to take account of the effect of the firm's actions on future busi
ness" and by "contractual arrangements."9
The importance of relationship-specific investments to organiza
tion is ultimately an empirical question and, as such, Miwa and
Ramseyer's claims require an empirical response.10 Good empirical
research is always rooted in theory, however. So before turning to the
evidence, some consideration of the underpinnings of the relationship
specific investment hypothesis is in order.
I.

THE THEORY

Miwa and Ramseyer summarize the relationship-specific invest
ment hypothesis as follows: "According to this intuition, the scope
and size of RSis can directly affect the governance arrangements firms
choose. Whether business partners negotiate long-term contracts,
spot contracts, equity investments, franchise arrangements, or even
mergers can depend vitally on the RSis at stake."11
Though perhaps intentionally hyperbolic, this characterization
nevertheless overstates the role that specific investments play in the
theory.
To be sure, relationship-specific investments have been
prominent, arguably even central, in the "operationalization" of
transaction-cost reasoning. But the effect of specific investments on
organizational form in the theory is neither direct, exclusive, nor
decisive. First, contrary to Miwa and Ramseyer's portrayal of the
relationship-specific investment hypothesis as predicting the adoption

8. Id. Coase actually goes one step further, declaring: "In any case, I am very doubtful
whether there is such a systematic relationship [between specific investments and costs of
contracting relative to vertical integration] as that described." Id.
9. Id. at 44. Remarkably, Coase documents that he formed his views of the importance
of relationship-specific investments very early on. The following are excerpts from corre
spondence from Coase to Ronald Fowler in 1932:
Suppose the production of a particular product requires a large capital equipment which is,
however, specialized insofar that it can only be used for the particular product concerned or
can only be readapted at great cost Then the firm producing such a product for one con
sumer finds itself faced with one great risk - that the consumer may transfer his demand
elsewhere or that he may exercise his monopoly power to force down the price
•

•

•

•

Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 4, at 43 (letter dated March 24, 1932).
My queries about the form of contracts for products requiring large capital equipment has
shown me that contractual arrangements can be made to avoid this risk. Thus, the consum
ing firm may buy the particular equipment itself even though it is in another company's
plant. There are a number of other contractual devices which tend to get over this difficulty.

Id. at 45 (letter dated May 7, 1932).
10. I leave it to Klein to respond to Coase's critique, which he does in Benjamin Klein,
Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON. 105 (2000).
11. Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2638 (emphasis added).
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of "extra-contractual governance arrangements," transaction-cost
economists have always regarded contracts and other organizational
arrangements as alternative responses to the appropriability hazards
engendered by specific investments.12 Klein, Crawford, and Alchian,
for example, expressly identify vertical integration and contracting as
substitute devices for curbing opportunism: "The primary alternative
to vertical integration as a solution to the general problem of oppor
tunistic behavior is some form of economically enforceable long-term
contract.... The relevant question then becomes when will vertical
integration be observed as a solution and when will the use of the
market-contracting process occur."3
1
The existence of relationship
specific assets, by itself, implies only the desirability of adopting some
protective governance arrangement but says nothing about which such
arrangement will be chosen;4
1 determining whether contracts, vertical
integration, franchising, rate-of-return regulation, or yet some other
organizational structure represents the best (least costly) solution re
quires incorporation of other considerations into the analysis.
And in fact, asset specificity is just one of a variety of factors the
theory identifies as affecting the relative efficiency of alternative gov
ernance arrangements. Among the more prominent, especially in re
lation to contracting, are reputation15 and the complexity of and uncer
tainty associated with the transaction.16
Indeed, complexity and
uncertainty have been at least as important as asset specificity in the
development of Williamson's framework. 17 Even in Williamson's

12. Miwa and Ramseyer subtly shift terminology from choosing among "governance
arrangements," see, e.g., Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2637, to choosing among "extra
contractual governance arrangements," see, e.g., id. at 2643, 2644. They also vacillate in
qualifying the prediction with a reference to inlpediments to contracting.
13. Klein et al., supra note 3, at 302. Cf. Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Struc
ture of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 105 (1988)
("Other things equal, we expect the parties more frequently to choose vertical integration or
a long-term contract as the quasi-rents associated with specific investments become more

inlportant and the associated benefits of precommitment increase." (emphasis added)).
14. See generally Klein et al., supra note 3; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETs AND
HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) [hereinafter
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES]; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Eco
nomics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) [hereinafter
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics]; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985)
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS].
15. See, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 3, at 304.
16. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 14, at 21-24;
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 14, at 56-60.
17. For example, Williamson's discussion of inlpediments to contracting posed by com
plexity and uncertainty take precedence over his discussion of idiosyncratic investments in
MARKETs AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 14, at 8-10, 20-30. For Williamson's earlier for
mulation of the theory, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production:
Market Failure Considerations, AM. ECON. REV., May 1971 (Papers and Proceedings of the
Eighty-Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association), 112, especially the
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more recent writings, where relationship-specific investment has
played a more prominent role, maladaptation problems arise only in
the presence of uncertainty and complexity. Thus, Williamson de
scribes adaptation as the central problem of organization18 and
"[t]ransactions conducted under certainty [as] relatively uninterest
ing. "19 Similarly, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian ascribe the choice beM
tween contracting and integration to the complexity of the transaction:
"As we shall see, the costs of contractually specifying all important
elements of quality varies considerably by type of asset. For some asM
sets it may be essentially impossible to effectively specify all elements
of quality and therefore vertical integration is more likely. "20
All of this has two implications. First, as always where human beM
havior is subject to influences from multiple sources, predicting the efM
feet of one determinant on the choice of governance form requires
that other determinants be held constant. Second, because we can
never control for all of the factors that affect such decisions, our theoM
ries can only yield probabilistic, never deterministic, predictions. The
theory does not say, as Miwa and Ramseyer would have it, that trans
actors will adopt extra-contractual governance arrangements when
production involves large relationship-specific investments, only that,
holding other things (complexity, uncertainty, reputation, and so on)
constant, the likelihood that SOl,lle specialized governance arrangeM
ment will be adopted increases. Whether that arrangement will be a
contract or vertical integration or another arrangement depends on
the effectiveness of those alternatives in the prevailing circumstances.21

subsection entitled "Contractual Incompleteness," at 115-17, in which he states that "only
when the need to make unprogrammed adaptations is introduced does the market versus
internal organization issue become engaging," id. at 113.

18. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of
Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269, 277-79 (1991).
19. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 14, at 253. Much of the em
pirical literature also explicitly treats vertical integration as the result of a combination of
specific investments and complexity/uncertainty. See, e.g., Scott E. Masten, The Organiza
tion of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry, 27 J.L. & ECON. 403 (1984); Erin
Anderson & David C. Schmittlein, Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examina
tion, 15 RAND J. ECON. 385 (1984); Erin Anderson, Transaction Costs as Determinants of
Opportunism in Integrated and Independent Sales Forces, 9 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 247
(1988); Bruce R. Lyons, Contracts and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of Transaction
Cost Theory, 3 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 257 (1994).
20. Klein et al., supra note 3, at 301. Later in the article, Klein et al. contrast the prob
lems of contracting for land and employment services: "The primary reason [why land
rental contracts rather than vertical integration can often be used to attenuate opportunistic
behavior in agricultural contracts] is because it is rather cheap to specify and monitor the
relevant contract terms (the quality of the good being purchased) and to enforce this par
ticular rental contract." Id. at 320. They contrast this with employment contracts "where it
is essentially impossible to effectively specify and enforce quality elements (for example, all
working conditions and the effort expended by workers)
" Id.
. . . •

21. Holding complexity and uncertainty c�nstant (at some nontrivial level), an increase
in the level of asset specificity may increase the probability of integration if, for example,
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THE EVIDENCE

Japanese Automotive Subcontracting

Like Cease, Miwa and Ramseyer arrive at their conclusion from
observations of the automotive industry, albeit half a continent, an
ocean, and more than half a century distant in space and time. In the
Japanese automotive supply industry, they inform us, (i) second- and
third-tier suppliers, like their erstwhile circuit-producing employer,
make few large investments of any type and, a fortiori, few large in
vestments specific to a particular customer, and (ii) the investments of
first-tier suppliers, though sometimes large, are at most only model
rather than firm- (relationship-) specific and, with model changes oc
curring every three or four years, are short-lived.22
Their account of the industry, they readily admit, is impressionistic:
They have no direct measures of specific investments to support their
conclusion of the absence of "widespread, substantial physical-asset or
human-capital RSis."23 More fundamentally, however, Miwa and
Ramseyer's judgment that the industry lacks large specific investments
begs the question of what large is. Even if Miwa and Ramseyer were
able to provide a precise monetary value for the specific investments
in the industry, against what metric could we judge whether or not
those values are large? U.S. auto companies spend millions of dollars
on model-specific tooling and other investments. How are we to com
pare these to the value of investments specific to the production of
particular components going into the manufacture of jet engines or
missiles or the installation of cable television systems? How does the
three- to four-year product cycle of automobiles compare with the du
rability of a sales representative's investment in knowledge of a manu
facturer's product?
As the discussion of the preceding section indicates, how large and
durable specific investments must be to affect the choice of govern
ance in any particular circumstance is something that the theory does
not - and cannot - answer. In principle, even very small levels of
quasi-rents could be enough to motivate the adoption of protective
governance arrangements if those arrangements are low cost. Again,
all the theory tells us is that, in any given setting, the probability that
the hazards of simple bargains will exceed the costs of alternative gov
ernance arrangements increases as the level of specific investments
(and associated quasi-rents) increases.

increased specificity motivates longer-term, and therefore more costly, contracts (relative to
integration). But this effect is indirect in that it works through changes in contracting be
havior.
22. See Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2653- 54.
23. Id. at 2637.
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From this perspective, Miwa and Ramseyer's discursive account of
the industry appears to line up pretty well with the relationship
specific investment hypothesis: Small, higher-tier suppliers in the in
dustry use fairly standard assets to produce (to order) relatively simple
components but, at the same time, also do not enjoy the protections of
long-term contracts or other specialized governance structures. First
tier and larger, second-tier suppliers, by contrast, (i) make larger in
vestments, some of which are specific to a particular customer's prod
uct, and (ii) are, correspondingly, the ones more likely to employ
cross-equity holdings and other safeguards.24 The largest specific in
vestments, if the theory is correct, would not be found among suppli
ers at all but within the automobile manufacturers themselves. The
organizational puzzle of the Japanese automotive industry - if indeed
there is one - is how manufacturers and suppliers managed to get by
for so long using relatively short-term, nondetailed contracts despite
the sizeable model-specific investments involved.25
B.

Statistical Analysis

Though Miwa and Ramseyer regard their discursive account as
providing the most compelling evidence, they nevertheless supplement
their impressionistic evidence with a more formal statistical analysis.
Like others who have conducted empirical studies in this area, Miwa
and Ramseyer do not have direct measures of the explanatory vari
ables of interest and must settle for proxies. Although the quality of
the proxies will affect our confidence in the results, this alone is not a
reason to forgo the analysis.
The organizational arrangement they wish to explain is the holding
by assemblers of equity investments in their suppliers. Although they
include a variety of control variables in their estimations, the two vari
ables of particular interest are (i) the percent of a supplier's output
going to a given assembler and (ii) whether the supplier is a member
of one (and only one) assembler's supplier association. Of these two,
only the first, the assembler's share of the supplier's output, is consis
tently statistically significant, indicating that an assembler is more
likely to have significant equity holdings in a supplier for whom it is a
major customer.
To many, this may seem like pretty strong support for the
relationship-specific hypothesis; in plain English, the results say that

24. Miwa and Ramseyer's distinction between model-specific and relationship-specific
investments is irrelevant; all that matters is the difference between the value of the asset in
its first-best use (supplier B producing model X for customer A) and its value if the transac
tion between A and B does not take place.
25. See Klein, supra note 10, at 127 (attributing this success to reputational considera
tions).
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the more dependent is a supplier on a particular customer for its sales,
the more likely the transactors are to engage in cross-equity holdings.
Miwa and Ramseyer, however, deploy a rather elaborate argument to
suggest that membership in a single supplier association (LoneClub) is
a better measure of specific investments than a supplier's dependence
on its principle customer and that the insignificance of the former
shows that specific investments are not important.
The argument itself is problematic but, even if it were valid, rea
sons exist for not placing too much emphasis on the LoneClub results.
First, whether to belong to a supplier association and, if so, to how
many, are themselves decision variables. As a statistical matter, re
sults of standard regressions containing endogenous variables as
"right-hand-side" explanatory variables have no meaningful interpre
tation. The point can be illustrated with a simple example: Suppose,
as some have argued, that belonging to a supplier association is itself a
means of protecting against hold up and that supplier association
membership and equity investments are alternative (substitute) ways
of securing that protection.26 By reducing the risk of appropriation,
association membership could thus very well decrease the need for
equity investments, resulting in a negative correlation between asso
ciation membership and cross-equity holdings. The point is that,
without a more fully specified model of association membership and
its interactions with equity holdings, we can infer very little from these
results. Also troubling is the fact that Miwa and Ramseyer's regres
sions show no significant difference between belonging to no associa
tion, one association, or multiple associations. If membership in an as
sociation is a mere formality, or if the associations themselves are
"trivial social clubs"27 with no effect on firm behavior, this variable be
comes a very thin foundation indeed on which to reject the theory.
C.

The Broader Empirical Literature

The empirical literature examining the determinants of organiza
tional form and contract design is extensive, certainly far too large to
review here. Suffice it to say, surveys of the literature have all come to
virtually the same conclusion, namely, that transaction-cost economics
has been profoundly successful empirically.28 The industries analyzed

26. Miwa and Ramseyer, for example, describe Gilson and Roe as arguing that cross
shareholdings and membership in business groups help to address the problem of appropri
ability. See Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 2644.
27. Id. at 2661.
28. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction
Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335 (1995); Keith J.
Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from
Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation, 9 J. REG. ECON. 5 (1996); Bruce
R. Lyons, Empirical Relevance ofEfficient Contract Theory: Inter-Firm Contracts, OXFORD
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include such seemingly quotidian settings as ocean shipping, 29 over
land trucking, 30 marketing and distribution, 31 engineering subcon
tracting, 32 and even automotive supply, 33 not to mention more exotic
industries like petroleum coke refining. 34 Some even use measures
similar to Miwa and Ramseyer to reflect the specificity of investments;
Lyons, for example, regards the share of output taken by a firm's most
important customer as a measure of the firm's vulnerability to hold
up. 35 Asset specificity is not the only variable shown to affect govern
ance form in these studies, nor are specific investments the critical
variable in every setting. But as Michael Whinston wrote recently, the
prediction that an "increase in quasi-rents will increase the likelihood
of vertical integration . . . is so far consistent with nearly all of the ex
isting empirical literature. " 36

REv. ECON. POL'Y, Winter 1996, at 27; Regis Coeurderoy & Bertrand Quelin, L'economie
des coats de transaction: un bi/an des etudes empiriques sur l'integration verticale [Transac
tion-Cost Theory: A Survey on Empirical Studies on Vertical Integration], 107 REV.
D'ECONOMIE POLmQUE 145 (1997); Scott E. Masten & Stephane Saussier, Econometrics of
Contracts: An Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting, 92

REV. D'ECONOMIE lNDUSTRIELLE 215 (2000).
2 9. See, e.g., Stephen Craig Pirrong, Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A
Transactions Cost Explanation, 36 J.L. & ECON. 937 (1993).
30. See, e.g., THOMAS N. HUBBARD, How WIDE IS THE SCOPE OF HOLD-UP-BASED
THEORIES? CONTRACTUAL FORM AND MARKET THICKNESS IN TRUCKING (Nat'! Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7347, 1999); JACK A. NICKERSON & BRIAN S.
SILVERMAN, WHY AREN'T ALL TRUCK DRIVERS OWNER-OPERATORS? ASSET OWNER
SHIP AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN INTERSTATE FOR-HIRE TRUCKING (Har
vard Business School, Working Paper No. 00-01, 1999).
31. See, e.g., Anderson & Schmittlein, supra note 19; Anderson, supra note 19; Erin An
derson & Anne T. Coughlan, International Market Entry and Expansion via Independent or
Integrated Channels of Distribution, 51 J. MARKETING 71 (1987); George John & Barton A.
Weitz, Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Analy
sis, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 337 (1988); Jan B. Heide & George John, The Role of Dependence
Balancing in Safeguarding Transaction-Specific Assets in Conventional Channels, 52 J.
MARKETING 20 (1988).
32 See, e.g., Bruce R. Lyons, Contract and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of
Transaction Cost Theory, 3 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 257 (1994).
33. See, e.g., Kirk Monteverde & David J. Teece, Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical
Integration in the Automobile Industry, 13 BELL J. ECON. 206 (1982); Kirk Monteverde &
David J. Teece, Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration, 25 J.L. & ECON. 321
(1982); Scott E. Masten et al., Vertical Integration in the U.S. Auto Industry: A Note on the
Influence of Transaction Specific Assets, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 265 (1989),
34. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg & John R. Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in
Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON. 369 (1987).
35. Lyons, supra note 32.
36. Michael D. Whinston, On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integra
tion, at 2 (Feb. 9, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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III. CONCLUSION
Like the proverbial economist who searches for his car keys under
the streetlight rather than in the alley where he lost them because "the
light is so much better there," Miwa and Ramseyer go looking for ex
amples of large relationship-specific investments where the theory
says they should be least likely to find them: in the facilities of suppli
ers rather than in the auto companies themselves. Not finding them
there, they conclude that they don't exist and take the bus home.
Miwa and Ramseyer's skepticism of the role played by
relationship-specific investments in the organization of the Japanese
automotive industry is undoubtedly genuine and may even be justi
fied. Although the evidence they present does not support their case,
additional research may yet prove them right.
At a broader level, skepticism toward specific investment-based
explanations is a healthy attitude. The empirical successes of the the
ory so far combined with the fact that virtually every transaction in
volves some level of irreversible and unrecoverable investment - if
only to cross the street or search out another web page - make it
temptingly easy to ascribe any and all observed organizational ar
rangements to specific investments. Econotribologists37 need to be on
guard that specific investments do not become the handy but empty
catchall explanation that, in succession, transaction costs, risk aver
sion, and asymmetric information have been. Progress on the road to
understanding the causes and consequences of organization requires,
as Oliver Williamson is fond of pointing out, "modest, slow, molecu
lar, definitive work."38

37. Econotribology, n., the study of economic frictions: transaction-cost economics.
[neologism from ECONO(MICS) + TRIBOLOGY, the science of the mechanisms of friction.]
38. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 13 (1996 ).

